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Abstract
In this paper, we revisit the classical trade-o between centralized
and decentralized provision of local public goods, in a setting where in-
terregional spillovers depend on the level of a national public good. We
compare the standard benevolent planner approach with a political econ-
omy in which decisions, in a centralized system, are undertaken by a
non-cooperative legislature with no separation of powers. We observe
that the policy-maker in a centralized system is able to play both with
local public goods and spillovers, a mechanism that is not available un-
der a decentralized system. When compared to the traditional exogenous
spillovers assumption, this improves the case for centralization under the
standard benevolent planner approach. However, the same is not neces-
sarily true in the non-cooperative legislature, as in this case the interests
of the legislator do not need to be aligned with those of the society. Fi-
nally, we extend the traditional political economy analysis by considering
a legislature in which decisions are undertaken by dierent committees
(separation of powers), and show that it performs better than the original
non-cooperative legislature, greatly improving the case for centralization.
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The literature has, to a great extent, disregarded the impact that dierent
organizational systems might have on the implementation of public goods that
generate spillovers, and on the consequent economic eects on the provision
of local public goods and welfare. In other words, the analysis of the trade-
o between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods has
been focused on horizontal externalities (between jurisdictions), while assuming
that the level of spillovers remains unchanged as we move from one system
to the other. We can, however, think of real life situations where this is not
necessarily true. For instance, the residents living in metropolitan areas may
benet from several amenities provided in central cities (for example, museums,
parks, cultural activities), and vice-versa, but the actual benet they are able
to extract from these amenities depends on the transportation costs or on the
time it takes to move across regions (spillovers).1 Often, these infrastructures
are built jointly by communities (i.e. at a national level), but nevertheless their
provision depends on the supply of local amenities in each jurisdiction, which
in turn depend on the regime we are in (centralization or decentralization).
As another example, in a completely dierent context, consider a country, like
Belgium or Switzerland, where dierent regions have distinct ocial languages.
In this case, if one citizen intents to enjoy a good play, he will most certainly
choose a theater in the region where he lives, since a majority of the population
is only able to speak the mother tongue. If the central government chooses a
multilingual education policy, then citizens will certainly enjoy greater benets
from plays that are in a dierent language than their mother tongue (higher
benets from local public goods in other regions). However, the benets of this
policy depend on the supply of theaters, which in turn depend again on the
regime we consider.
Hence, dierent systems can also be characterized by distinct vertical in-
teractions between local public goods and spillovers, which has a clear impact
on the supply of spillovers themselves, as well as on welfare and consequently
on the trade-o between centralization and decentralization. It is this vertical
dimension that characterize the supply of public goods, and that the literature
has neglected so far, that we intent to capture and understand here.
The objective of this paper is precisely to revisit this trade-o in a setup
where spillovers are endogenous to the political system itself. We consider that
the level of spillovers in the society depends on the provision of a national public
good, which can be interpreted as the quality of the transportation network con-
necting jurisdictions, or the investment in a multilingual education system, as in
the examples above. This modelization allows us to capture not only the usual
horizontal interactions between local public goods in dierent jurisdictions, but
also the vertical interactions between local public goods and the national public
good, which will obviously dier depending on the system we consider. Hence,
any comparison between centralization and decentralization must be put not is
terms of spillovers, but in terms of the cost of providing these spillovers, which
constitutes a modication of the decentralization theorems presented in the lit-
erature. We also compare the dierences induced by this methodology with
the traditional exogenous spillovers assumption, identifying the major changes
1This example was adapted from Bloch and Zenginobuz (2007).
1driven by vertical strategic interactions.
We start by analyzing the standard benevolent planner approach, proposed
by Oates (1972), as well as a political economy perspective in which the cen-
tralized system is based on a non-cooperative legislature with no separation of
powers, along the lines of Besley and Coate (2003). We nd that the policy-
maker in a centralized system is able to play at the same time with local public
goods and spillovers, shaping the nal outcome according to his objective, while
in a decentralized system no policy-maker benets of such advantage, as de-
cisions on local public goods and spillovers are allocated to dierent tiers of
government. We show that, while this improves the case for centralization un-
der the standard approach as compared to the case of exogenous spillovers, the
same is not necessarily true in the traditional non-cooperative legislature. The
reason is that, in the former, the objectives of the policy-maker are aligned with
those of the society, while, in the latter, the appointed legislator under a cen-
tralized system will make use of the interaction between local public goods and
spillovers to feed his selsh interests, imposing larger costs on the society.
This result left us wondering if there exists an alternative setting that elim-
inates, or at least limits, the expropriation that the agenda setter is able to
impose on the remaining society, when a centralized system is in place. And in
fact the answer turns out to be quite simple: a centralized system based on sep-
aration of powers, where dierent committees, composed by distinct members
of the legislature (that is, belonging to distinct jurisdictions), are responsible
for setting dierent policy vectors, i.e., one committee is selected to set the pro-
vision of local public goods, while the other, possibly with divergent interests,
sets the supply of the national public good, determining the level of spillovers.
This organizational system not only outperforms the traditional non-cooperative
legislature, but also restores the result of the standard approach, i.e., the rel-
ative performance of centralization against decentralization is clearly improved
as compared to the case of exogenous spillovers, in sense that the range of pa-
rameters (preferences and marginal costs) for which the former dominates the
latter is increased.
To make these ideas clear, we consider an economy which is composed by two
geographically distinct jurisdictions. In each jurisdiction there is a local public
good, which benets not only the citizens in that region, but has also benecial
spillover eects to the other region. Under decentralization, the provision of
local public goods is set by the local government, while, in a centralized regime,
this task is left to the central authority. The level of spillovers, in turn, depends
on the provision of a national public good, which is always decided by the central
government.
Under the standard approach, here slightly modied to contemplate the case
for endogenous spillovers, all decisions are made by a benevolent government.
In a decentralized system, the regional governments choose simultaneously and
independently the level of public goods to maximize the surplus of their con-
stituents, while the national government independently sets the level of spillovers
in order to maximize aggregate surplus. Under centralization, the central gov-
ernment chooses the amount of local public goods to provide in both regions, as
well as the level of spillovers to implement, so as to maximize aggregate surplus.
As in Oates (1972), in order to generate some costs for the case of centraliza-
tion, we impose the ad hoc assumption of \policy uniformity," i.e. the central
authority is not able to discriminate local public good provision according to
2regional preferences. This assumption is usually justied on the grounds of in-
formation ows, as it is understood that a centralized regime has less knowledge
of regional preferences comparing to a government that is \closer to people."
Although widely used in scal federalism,2 as it is an easy way to generate costs
for the centralized system without going over the details of the political process,
and corroborated by some evidence (Panizza, 1999), this assumption seems un-
satisfactory, as it lacks motivation (see Lockwood, 2006). However, it enables
us to lay ground for the richer environment of a political economy setup that
lies ahead.
Under these standards, the regional governments in a decentralized regime
fail to internalize the spillover eect, as the benets that local public goods might
have on the neighbor jurisdiction are not taken into account. Hence, the central
authority decides on the amount of spillovers relying upon sub-optimal levels
of local public goods. On the other hand, a centralized regime, although not
capable of shaping the provision of local public goods to regional preferences,
is able not only to internalize interregional spillovers, but also to play with
the eects that local public goods have in the optimal provision of spillovers,
dening a mix of these variables that takes into account this interaction. It
follows that, if the cost of providing the national public good is low, the supply
of local public goods should be decided according to the preferences of the
whole society, as they could be easily accessed by the other jurisdiction through
the implementation of a high level of spillovers. In this case, centralization
clearly outperforms decentralization, as the drawback of this system is set to
a minimum. The same result holds if the cost of the national public good is
high, but preferences are close to each other, as both jurisdictions want similar
levels of local public goods. If the cost of the national public good is high
and preferences are (signicantly) heterogeneous, regional preferences become
more relevant to decision-making, as the internalization of spillovers becomes
less important. Therefore, a system which is \closer to people" is preferred.
We depart afterwards from this setup, turning our attention to more recent
perspectives that explain the trade-o between centralization and decentral-
ization through politics. Our two approaches are based on a non-cooperative
legislature, which relies on the citizen candidate framework proposed by Besley
and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Al Slivinski (1996). In practical terms, we
follow closely the methodology in Besley and Coate (2003), as it constitutes a
tractable way to analyze political issues, while allowing for an intuitive modi-
cation that allows us to model the level of spillovers within the society.
Under a centralized regime where no separation of powers is allowed, the
selshness of the minimum winning coalition is going to play out, leading to
misallocation in the provision of local public goods, and uncertainty both in the
provision of local public goods and spillovers.3 That is, the legislator who is
in charge of setting the policy only takes into consideration the region of his
constituents, deploying local public goods in the other jurisdiction according to
the benets he is able to exploit through spillover eects (misallocation), but
the identity of this legislator is dependent on who is selected as the agenda
2See, for example, Akai and Mikami (2006); Koppel (2005); Cheikbossian (2000). The
same idea is also applied on topics related to the size of nations (see Goyal and Staal, 2004;
Bolton and Roland, 1997).
3The issues of uncertainty and misallocation with respect to local public goods were rst
presented in Besley and Coate (2003).
3setter (uncertainty). On the other hand, a decentralized system, while enabling
preference matching in the provision of local public goods, not only does not
allow for the internalization of any spillover eects, but may also be character-
ized by uncertainty in the provision of these spillovers, as the identity of the
national legislator is also unknown a priori. The interaction of these forces ul-
timately determines which system outperforms the other. However, contrary
to the standard approach, decentralization comes out of this trade-o in signi-
cative advantage, as it may pen up the selshness interests of the minimum
winning coalition. In other words, by allocating decision-making to dierent
tiers of government, decentralization does not allow the central government to
play with the interaction between the supply of local and national public goods
for his own benet, eliminating misallocation completely and reducing uncer-
tainty, since the variability of public good allocations is much smaller under
this system. It follows that centralization is able to outperform a decentralized
regime only if preferences across jurisdictions are similar and the cost of pro-
viding spillovers is low enough, since in this case the interests of the agenda
setter are to some extent aligned with those of the society. Otherwise, if prefer-
ences across jurisdictions are to some extent heterogeneous, it may happen that
decentralization always dominates centralization.
Finally, we consider a non-cooperative legislature with separation of powers,
such that, under a centralized regime, the supply of local and national public
goods is chosen by dierent members of the legislature representing distinct
jurisdictions. This organizational system refrains the selshness of the mem-
bers in the legislature, by reducing both misallocation and uncertainty when
compared to the case of no separation of powers, while still taking into consid-
eration vertical interactions between the supply of public goods with distinct
spacial characteristics. Consequently, the relative performance of centralization
against the alternative of decentralization is improved. However, even in this
case, the decentralized system may be able to outperform centralization for large
degrees of heterogeneity in preferences.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the optimal solution, making a rst approach to the vertical
interactions which will be present throughout the paper. Section 4 analyzes
the modied standard approach. Section 5 deals with a political economy per-
spective based on a non-cooperative legislature without separation of powers.
Section 6 picks up the previous analysis, while dealing with the case of separa-
tion of powers. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Related literature
The analysis of issues related to scal decentralization dates back to Tiebout
(1956) and Williams (1966), although it was not until the inuential work on
\Fiscal Federalism," due to Oates (1972), that the trade-o between centraliza-
tion and decentralization has been put forward for the rst time. Along these
lines, he has formulated the so called \Decentralization Theorem," which asserts
that centralization should only take place once the costs imposed by a uniform
provision of local public goods are outweighed by the benets coming from the
internalization of spillovers.
In the subsequent years, no alternative approach has been proposed to ad-
4dress this issue, although the assumption of policy uniformity was understood as
non-satisfactory. However, in recent contributions, Lockwood (2002) and Besley
and Coate (2003) have put forward an alternative explanation to this trade-o,
that is no longer based on this assumption. The idea of these papers consists in
bringing politics and institutions into the model, so that an endogenous justi-
cation to prefer one system over the other can be found without imposing any
ad-hoc assumption that sustains the nal conclusion.4
The former paper deals predominantly with legislative processes, thereby
assuming that citizens within each district are identical and that local public
goods consist in one discrete project. The latter, which is much closer to our
approach, deals, in its main stream, with political outcomes. It analyzes both
a cooperative and non-cooperative legislature, and nds in each one issues that
are able to generate an endogenous costs of centralization, therefore creating a
trade-o which is settled by the level of spillovers in the society. Under a non-
cooperative legislature, both misallocation and uncertainty problems come along
with a centralized system, reecting the selshness interests of the minimum
winning coalition, who tries to allocate more spending to the jurisdiction of
his constituents. In a cooperative legislature, it is strategic delegation to public
good lovers that ends up undermining centralization, which will be characterized
by over-provision of public goods. Some recent papers, like the ones by Dur
and Roelfsema (2005) on cost sharing, and Schnellenbach et al. (2007) on the
likeliness to centralize on a direct versus a representative democracy, have made
use of these new approaches to explore further issues on this eld.
2 The basic framework
For simplicity, let us consider an economy which is divided into 2 geographically
distinct districts, indexed by k 2 f1;2g. Each district has a continuum of
citizens with a mass of unity. There are 4 goods in the economy: a single private
good, x; two local public goods, g1 and g2, each one associated with a particular
district; and a national public good, G. While the former can be thought of
as parks, entertainment places, museums, or even shopping centers, the latter
can be, for example, national roads, highways, railways, or even in a subway
that connects both districts, lowering transportation costs across jurisdictions
and increasing the utility provided by local public goods that are far away.
Hence, while local public goods provide utility directly, the role of national
public goods is to increase the mobility of individuals across regions, allowing
them to appropriate higher benets from local public goods that are not in their
jurisdiction. As such, we consider that the central government is responsible for
setting the level of investment in these national public goods.
Citizens are heterogeneous regarding their preference for public goods, de-
noted by . In each district, the range of preference types is (0;  ]. The mean
type in district k, denoted by mk, is assumed equal to the median type.5 With-
out loss of generality, consider that districts are ordered such that m1  m2.
4For a brief survey on scal decentralization under a political economy perspective, see
Lockwood (2006).
5This formulation allows us to focus on eciency issues related to public good provision,
putting aside distributional considerations, which are not our concern.
5We follow Besley and Coate (2003), Dur and Roelfsema (2005) and Schnel-
lenbach et al. (2007), and assume that the preferences of a type  individual
living in jurisdiction k are given by:
uk(x;g;G;) = x + 

b(gk) + K(G)  b(gl)

; k;l = 1;2; k 6= l (1)
where g = (g1;g2). The functions b(gk) : R+ 7! R+ and K(G) : R+ 7! [0;1) are
twice continuous dierentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. Both
satisfy the Inada conditions. One permissible class of functions, which will




G+1, with ; 2 (0;1).
It is clear in this formulation that citizens benet not only from the public
good in their district, but also from the public good in the other district. The
size of this eect depends on the amount of the national public good available.
Notice that the spillover eect is the same for all citizens, irrespective of their
type; what changes is the individual benet provided by local public goods, such
that those with higher  value them more heavily. Furthermore, we rule out
situations where the public good in the other district is more valued by citizens
than their own public good.
The marginal cost of producing both local and national public goods is
assumed constant. In order to produce one unit of a local public good,  units
of the private good are required, while producing one unit of the national public
good requires  units of the private good.
Under a decentralized system, the level of provision of the local public good
in each district is chosen by the government of that district, and is nanced by
a uniform head tax levied on local residents. Thus, if district k chooses a public
good level gk, each citizen in this district pays a tax of gk. Under a centralized
system, local public good provision in each district is determined by the central
authority and nanced by a uniform head tax levied on all citizens. Hence,
public good levels g1 and g2 imply a head tax of 
g1+g2
2 in each district.6 The
national public good is always chosen centrally, and nanced through a uniform
tax levied on all citizens of G, which is distributed evenly across jurisdictions.
It is assumed that agents are endowed with enough private good to pay their
tax obligations.7
3 The optimal solution
For later reference, let us nd the optimal levels for both local public goods
and for the national public good. Under the usual assumption that the social
6This approach follows the main stream in the literature (see Besley and Coate, 2003;
Redoano and Scharf, 2004; Dur and Roelfsema, 2005).
7Observe that, in this setup, a higher value for  may just reect the fact that the districts
are relatively far from each other, or are separated by some kind of natural barrier or obstacle,
which increases the cost of building an infrastructure that connects both regions. For example,
there may be the need to build bridges, tunnels, or to employ longer routes, that require higher
levels of investment to attain the same amount of spillovers, resulting in a higher value for .
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As m1 exceeds m2, district 10s level of public good provision is obviously
higher, as the mean citizen is more pro-public spending in district 1 than his
counterpart in district 2. Also, some algebra allows us to conclude that an in-
crease in G originates a higher optimal level of local public goods. This happens
because a higher level of provision of the national public good allows the citizens
in each jurisdictions to benet more from the spillovers created by local public
goods that are in the other district. Hence it becomes optimal to also provide a
greater amount of local public goods, as the benets spread much faster to the
neighbor district.
Equation (4) states that the optimal level of G is such that the marginal
benet equals the marginal cost of providing one more unit of the national
public good. While the marginal cost is just the amount citizens have to pay
for one more unit of the national public good, the marginal benet is the sum
across all jurisdictions of the spillovers created by each local public good, due
to a marginal increase in the level of G.
4 The modied standard approach
In this section, we take up on Oates' (1972) approach, and assume that decision-
makers are benevolent, in sense that they maximize the welfare of their juris-
diction (in the case of decentralization), or of the whole economy (in the case
of centralization).
Some assumptions on the timing of decisions regarding the decentralized
system must be made. We consider that, in the rst stage of the game, national
authorities choose the level of the national public good that maximizes aggregate
8Note that, as both jurisdictions are exactly symmetric ex-ante, there are no equity issues
and the utility function is quasi-linear (hence, the marginal utility of private consumption
is equal across jurisdictions), the utilitarian approach is perfectly suitable for the present
context.
9It can be shown that, without further assumptions, the rst order conditions might dene
a saddle point and more than one local maxima. In order to rule out these situations, which
add nothing to the current discussion, and to impose uniqueness on the solution, we further












 K0(G) is decreasing in G. That is, the
marginal benet for the society from the national public good along the optimal path for both
local public goods must be decreasing.
10The proof is provided in the appendix.
7surplus, and thereafter local decision-makers choose simultaneously the supply
of the local public good in order to maximize the surplus in the district where
they belong.11 In the centralized system, there is no such issue, as the policy-
maker chooses all policy variables in order to maximize aggregate surplus.
4.1 The decentralized solution
Let us work by backward induction. In the second stage, both jurisdictions are
going to decide simultaneously and independently the provision of local public
goods, given the level of G chosen by the central authority. The local government










G; k;l = 1;2; k 6= l
The outcome of this problem yields an equilibrium in dominant strategies,
which simplies the exposition greatly. As jurisdictions only care about their
own public good, ignoring spillover eects to other districts, and cannot inuence
the decision-making of the remaining local authorities in order to appropriate
their spillovers, as decisions are undertaken in an independent fashion, it is easy







; k = 1;2 (5)
Hence, expenditures in local public goods are independent on the level of
the national public good, G. It is immediate to see that this results in under-
provision of all local public goods relatively to the optimal solution.
In the rst stage, the central authority decides the level of the national public





















 K0(Gd) =  (6)
Notice that equation (6) is very similar to (4). In both situations, we are
considering a benevolent central authority, but, in the former, she has no control
over local provision of public goods, while in the latter she sets both national
and local public goods. This implies the same decision rule, but evaluated at
dierent levels of g = (g1;g2). Furthermore, in the present case, an increase
in the provision of national public goods only allows citizens to benet more
from existing local public goods. Therefore, there are fewer incentives to spread
spillovers across jurisdictions, resulting in under-provision of the national public
good.
To sum up, local policy-makers fail to internalize the spillover eects orig-
inated by the national public good. As such, the national government under-
invests on the propagation of spillovers, as she is not able to convince local
11It turns out that in equilibrium the level of provision of all public goods is independent on
whether decisions are made sequentially or simultaneously, and on the assumed timing. This
is true as the provision of local public goods below is not a function of G:
8governments to increase the supply of local public goods in order to maximize
the appropriation of spillovers in the society. Henceforth, the surplus is lower
than what might otherwise have been.
4.2 The centralized solution
Considering g1 = g2 = g, the central authority chooses a uniform supply of local
public goods and a level of the national public good that solves:
max
g;G




 b(g)   2g   G
This formalization implies that the decision-maker maximizes the sum across
jurisdictions of all benets originated by local public goods, taking into account
that each one originates a direct eect in the district where it is provided and a
spillover eect, which depends on the level of the national public good, aecting







where m = m1+m2
2 , and Gc is dened implicitly by the following application:




Hence, the decision-maker provides the local public good up to a point where
its average marginal benet, which comprises the average direct benet plus
the average benet created through spillover eects, is exactly oset by the
marginal cost of providing it. Contrary to the decentralized solution, the central
authority internalizes the spillover eect, as she responds positively to a higher
level of the national public good, increasing the provision of local public goods.
The drawback is that she does not take into account the heterogeneity among
dierent districts in the economy, producing a \one size ts all" public good.
Equation (8) has the same interpretation as (4), except that now the level of
local public goods is uniform.
4.3 Centralization vs Decentralization: A brief discussion
From the previous discussion, it is immediate that the level of spillovers dier,
depending on which regime we are in. This new issue introduces a new dimension
in the classical trade-o between centralization and decentralization, to which
analysis we now turn.
For further discussion, it is convenient to dene the maximum level of surplus
attained under each system. For decentralization, we have:13
12See the appendix for a sketch of the proof.
Again, in order to avoid dealing with saddle points and possibly multiple local max-





 K0(G) is decreasing in G.
13For notational convenience, we suppress the dependence of welfare and public good allo-
















2)   Gd (9)
And for centralization:




 b(gc)   2gc   Gc (10)
4.3.1 Homogenous preferences
Assume that both jurisdictions have the same preference parameter for public
goods, i.e., m1 = m2. In this case, it is actually optimal to set a uniform level
of local public goods, and therefore the disadvantage of a centralized system
is minimized. Hence, while in a decentralized system, local decision-makers do
not have incentives to take into account the spillovers originated by local public
goods, as they do not benet from them, in the centralized system the policy-
maker is able to internalize fully and correctly all spillover eects. Therefore, she
takes into account the complete interaction between both local public goods and
the national public, consequently increasing the level of welfare in the society
as compared to decentralization. This argumentation enables us to draw the
following proposition:
Proposition 1. Under homogeneous preferences, the centralized system delivers
a higher welfare as compared to the decentralized system.
This result is similar to Besley and Coate (2003), except that now spillovers
are never absent from the society. This implies that the situation of no spillovers
is ruled out, and centralization yields a superior performance as compared to a
decentralized regime.
4.3.2 Heterogenous preferences
If districts are heterogeneous, the comparison between centralization and de-
centralization becomes opaque, as the dierence in welfare, Wc   Wd may not
necessarily be monotone in  for all possible specications of the function b(g)
and for all (m1;m2;). In order to deal with this extra complication that arises
under this scenario, we will work in a more specic setup, dening the benet
from local public goods as:
b(g) = g0:5 (11)
Under (11), the following proposition, which states a modied version of the
decentralization theorem, can then be put forward:14
Proposition 2. If districts have heterogeneous preferences, then there exists a
critical value b  such that the level of surplus under the centralized and decen-
tralized systems coincide. The decentralized system (strictly) dominates central-
ization if and only if  > b ; otherwise centralization allows a higher welfare.
14Proposition 2 remains valid under a more general setup. A sucient condition for it to












10If the cost of providing the national public good is low, it becomes optimal
from the society's point of view to supply similar amounts of local public goods
in both jurisdictions, as the benets conveyed by them could be given a national
relevance through the supply of a high level of a low cost national public good.
In other words, the supply of local public goods becomes a national issue, as the
benets can be scattered easily throughout the society, and hence it should be
decided according to the average preference of the society. This implies that the
drawback of the centralized system is set to a minimum, while a decentralized
regime, by ignoring the spillover eects, would attain a level of surplus far way
from these standards. On the other hand, for higher values of , it becomes
optimal from the society's point of view to supply a reduced amount of the
national public good, and consequently local public goods should be provided
according to individual preferences of each jurisdiction. This implies that de-
centralization provides a better match, while a centralized regime would simply
mismatch individual preferences.
This result presents a main dierence as compared to the usual decentraliza-
tion theorem, as it does not use critical values for spillovers, but rather states
the trade-o between centralization and decentralization in terms of the cost
of providing these spillovers. As for the same  these systems provide dierent
amounts of spillovers, this variable becomes more appropriate to the present
analysis. For example, we could take G as an index of the quality of an in-
frastructure connecting both districts and  to be the unitary cost per unit
of quality. In this perspective, building a high quality transportation network
would be much cheaper if districts were close to each other than if they were far
way, or separated by natural barriers or obstacles. According to this proposi-
tion, the case for centralization would be much stronger in the former situation,
while the latter would call for a decentralized approach.
An example
We now illustrate these results in a fully specied setup. Assume the following
specications:
b(gk) = g0:5
k and K(G) =
G0:5
G0:5 + 1
Also, let  = 1 and m = 5. Changing these parameters only aects the
responsiveness of the relationships, but not the main conclusions.15 The as-
sumption regarding the last parameter is established so that we are allowed to
impose changes in m1 and m2 without interfering on the average preference for
public goods in the society. Hence, m1   m2 2 [0;10). Figure 1 represents
the relative performance of centralization against decentralization, in the space
(m1   m2;;W c   Wd).
Several issues should be pointed out. If preferences are homogeneous, decen-
tralization is always dominated, as the assumption of policy uniformity does not
impose any cost on the centralized regime. However, as the degree of heterogene-
ity increases, the cuto b  for which centralization dominates decentralization
15The marginal cost of local public goods can be thought of as a normalization. The choice
of the average preference for public goods was made for graphical convenience.
11Figure 1: Dierence in welfare between centralization and decentralization.
decreases.16 This illustrates the cost of centralization: as preferences become
farther apart, for a given , the cost imposed by uniform provision becomes
larger, and centralization only remains a better option if it is allowed to ap-
propriate larger benets from the interaction between local and national public
goods, which, in turn, requires a lower  (see also gure 2 below).
To put the same idea dierently, we can think that, as  increases and
spillovers become more expensive, the gains obtained from centralization dimin-
ish, and public good provision based on local needs becomes more important
than internalizing spillovers.17
4.4 A comment on endogenous spillovers
Let us resume the general setup presented in section 2. As we had mentioned
before, local policy-makers in the decentralized system are not able to internalize
the spillover eects, as they ignore any benet that local public goods might
have on the neighbor districts. This implies that the national government can
do no better than to optimize over this behavior of his local counterparts, and so
the implicit relationship between the provision of local and national public goods
is not taken into account. Hence, the performance of the decentralized system
with endogenous spillovers is similar, in almost all aspects, to the traditional
16Observe that this cuto does not start at m1   m2 = 0, because we limited the range of
values  is allowed to take.
17Note that it is not correct to draw conclusions on the magnitude of the dierences in
welfare. As changes in m1 and m2 also have a direct impact on welfare, increases in this
magnitude may not indicate that the centralized system is performing \relatively better."
12approach widely presented in the literature.18 On the other hand, the policy-
maker in the centralized system is able to play with both local and national
public goods, taking into account the optimal interaction between them. This
further instrument, which was not available in the traditional approach with
exogenous spillovers, broadly improves the performance under centralization, as
pointed out in the following result:
Proposition 3. Endogenous spillovers never improve the case for decentraliza-
tion, in sense that the space of parameters (m1;m2;;) such that decentraliza-
tion dominates centralization is (weakly) larger when spillovers are exogenous.
Example (continued)
We return to the example introduced above to illustrate this result. Figure 2
represent the contour lines of the dierence in welfare between centralization
and decentralization, both for exogenous and endogenous spillovers. The steps
used to construct this gure follow closely the proof of proposition 3.19
Figure 2: Contour lines of the dierence in welfare between centralization and
decentralization, for the cases of endogenous and exogenous spillovers.
The important lines to retain from this gure are the zero-contour lines,
which represent the set of parameters in the space (m1   m2;) for which
the welfare under centralization and decentralization coincide, given . We
can observe that, when endogenous spillovers are considered, the region where
18Note that we use the word \almost" to safeguard for the fact that, in the current setup,
spillovers still have to be paid, an issue that is not present in the traditional approach.
19In fact, the mechanic is exactly the same. We start by building a mapping between  and
 the level of spillovers, using the function  = K(Gd), which allows us to represent the case
of exogenous spillovers in the space (m1   m2;), given . Then, we plot the contour lines
for the endogenous spillovers case.
13centralization outperforms decentralization is increased. In other words, when
endogenous spillovers are introduced, centralization gains a new mechanism to
increase welfare, which is not available in a decentralized system - the ability to
endogenize the strategic interaction between centrally and locally provided pub-
lic goods. Hence, decentralization can only outperform centralization if the cost
imposed by uniform provision increases enough to compensate the gain brought
to centralization by the vertical dimension of the problem, and this can only
be achieved through an increase in the degree of heterogeneity in preferences or
through an increase in the cost the national public good.
5 A modied political economy approach
We now model political decision-making, based on the citizen-candidate frame-
works proposed in Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Al Slivinski (1996).
It is assumed that decision-makers cannot commit themselves to a given pol-
icy platform prior to the election stage, and therefore they always follow their
preferred policies once in oce. Hence, citizens elect policy-makers whose pref-
erences match the ones they like. Policy preferences are common knowledge,
and there is no cost of entering into politics.
5.1 Policy determination under decentralization
Under decentralization, it is assumed that the provision of the national public
good is decided by the national legislature, while elected regional representatives
are responsible for setting the supply of local public goods in each jurisdiction.
We model this by setting up a four stage process, consisting of:20
 Stage 1: Citizens in each jurisdiction elect a legislator, among its mem-
bers, to the national legislature, by majority voting.
 Stage 2: The legislature chooses the provision of the national public good,
under the rules dened below.
 Stage 3: Citizens in each jurisdiction elect a policy-maker, among its
members, to the regional government, by majority voting. The legislator
appointed to the national legislature cannot run to the regional elections.
 Stage 4: Local policy-makers in each jurisdiction choose simultaneously
and independently the supply of local public goods to provide in order to
maximize their payos.
20Although we build a four stage process, the nal result holds if we consider a two stage
process where, in the rst stage, all citizens vote simultaneously and independently for the
national legislature and for the regional government, and, in the second stage, all elected
legislators set, simultaneously and independently, the provision of public goods which they
are responsible for, in order to maximize their payos. Reversing the order of decisions (i.e.,
having local decisions rst and national decisions afterwards), however, brings new elements to
the model, by creating strategic interaction at the local level, which, in turn, induces strategic
delegation. In this case, there is a positive probability that local policy-makers in one region
can use local public goods to inuence the level of spillovers implemented by the legislature,
and these will depend on the decision of the other region. Although interesting, this issue is
better left for a full treatment in a separate paper.
14The assumption that the legislator elected in stage 1 cannot run to regional
elections can be interpreted as a separation of powers, and avoids issues of strate-
gic voting when citizens elect their representative to serve in the legislature. As
usual, we look for a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Let the type of the
elected policy-maker in stage 3 in district k be given by k; k = 1;2. Working
by backward induction, and recalling that elected citizens follow their preferred
policies when in oce, the provided level of local public goods in district k is










G; k;l = 1;2; k 6= l








Hence, elected policy-makers only care about the net benet provided by the
local public good to themselves, neglecting any spillover eects over the other
jurisdiction.
In the third stage, citizens vote to elect the policy-maker who will set gk. A
















for k;l = 1;2; k 6= l. These preferences over types determine citizens' voting
decisions. Following Besley and Coate (2003), a pair of representative types
(
1;
2) is majority preferred under decentralization if, in each district k, a
majority of citizens prefers the type of their representative to any other type
 2 (0;  ], given the type of the other district's representative l; l 6= k. As
preferences over types are single-peaked, the application of the median voter
theorem implies that a pair of representative types (
1;
2) is majority preferred
if and only if it is a median pair, i.e., (
1;


















Under the assumption that the median voter is equal to the mean voter,
local public good provision in our political economy framework agrees with the
standard analysis.
Let us now turn our attention towards the second stage of the process. At
this point, it is necessary to dene the rules of how the legislature behaves.
There is no unied approach in the literature, although a number of dierent
alternatives have been suggested (see Lockwood, 2006). Here, we will use a
slightly modied version of the closed rule legislative bargaining proposed in a
seminal paper by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), and used in Besley and Coate
(2003). Let the type of the elected legislator in jurisdiction k in stage 1 be given
by 0
k; k = 1;2. In stage 2, one of the two legislators is randomly appointed to be
the agenda setter. He can then make a proposal for the level of G, which must
nd the support of a minimum winning coalition. In our two jurisdiction model,
and again following Besley and Coate (2003), each legislator can be thought of
15as a minimum winning coalition, as he represents exactly half of the electorate.
Hence, a type 0




























G; k 6= l
It can be checked that Gk(0















; k 6= l (15)
Notice that the left hand side is just the marginal benet of G for a type 0
k
citizen in jurisdiction k, which is generated through the spillovers of the local
public good in jurisdiction l, while the right hand side is the marginal cost of
providing one more unit of G for his jurisdiction.
In the rst stage, citizens in each jurisdiction elect the legislator who will take
part in the national legislature. As in stage 2 each delegate can be appointed as
the agenda setter with probability 1=2, the expected surplus of a type  citizen












































































for k;l = 1;2; k 6= l. Once again, citizens prefer a candidate of their own type.21
As preferences over types are single-peaked,22 an analogous argumentation to
the one used previously allows us to state that a pair of types (0
1 ;0
2 ) is majority
preferred if and only if it is a median pair. Hence, (0
1 ;0
2 ) = (m1;m2), and the
























This result no longer coincides with the standard analysis, unless both dis-
tricts are perfectly homogeneous. As there is a conict of interests among the
two delegates in the national legislature, due to dierences in the preference
parameter for public goods, each one nds optimal to generate a dierent level
of spillovers, and consequently to provide a dierent level of G. As Gpd depends
on the candidate selected to be the agenda setter, this will introduce uncer-
tainty over the implemented level of the national public good, which gets worse
as preferences become farther apart.
21Taking the derivative of EW
k(0
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k) > 0, one can
check instead that d2
dG2 EW
k(G) < 0, which is a much easier task.
165.2 Policy determination under centralization with no sep-
aration of powers
Under centralization, the policy vector (g;G) is chosen by the national legisla-
ture, and all costs are split uniformly across jurisdictions. The order of events
is as follows:
 Stage 1: Citizens in each jurisdiction elect a representative (delegate)
among them, by majority voting. Elected representatives compose the
national legislature.
 Stage 2: The legislature chooses the policy-vector (g;G).
As usual, we start analyzing the last stage. Let k be the type of the elected
legislator for district k in stage 1, k = 1;2. The rules of the legislative bargaining
are the same as for the decentralization case, except that now the agenda setter
chooses the whole policy-vector: centralization with no separation of powers.
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Hence, the legislator in jurisdiction k, if appointed to be the agenda setter,
chooses gk according to his direct benet, but only provides gl up to a point
where the spillover eect enables him to extract a positive net marginal benet
from the local public good in the other jurisdiction. Observe also that equation
(20) is very similar to equation (15), as in both situations the agenda setter
chooses the level of G according to the spillovers that the local public good in
the other jurisdiction is able to generate to him.
Now, to the workings of the rst stage. Each delegate is chosen to be the
agenda setter with probability 1=2. Hence, the expected surplus of a type 
citizen in district k in stage 1 is given by:
23The proof follows similar steps to the ones used for the centralized case in the modied



















































































with k;l = 1;2; k 6= l. It is easy to see that agents prefer candidates of their
own type. Using the notion of intermediate preferences,24 we conclude that the
pair (
1;
2) = (m1;m2) is majority preferred to any other possible alternative.




































where Gk is the solution to:
mkb(g
pc





; k 6= l (23)
This result reects the two drawbacks of the centralized system pointed
out in Besley and Coate (2003): uncertainty, as the identity of the minimum
winning coalition is unknown a priori, and misallocation, since the provision is
skewed towards those inside the coalition. In this context, however, both these
properties of the centralized system are endowed with an extra dimension as
compared to the exogenous spillovers framework. First, as now spillovers are
set by the appointed legislator, they are also subject to uncertainty, just as in the
decentralized case. Second, contrary to the standard approach, here the policy-
maker will take advantage of the interaction between local public goods and
spillovers exclusively to his own benet, which may induce a larger misallocation
eect, particularly if the preferences of the legislator do not correspond to the
interests of the society. As we explore further below, this last eect may or
may not overcome the gain induced by an extra degree of freedom gained by
considering endogenous spillovers.
Notice also that both uncertainty and misallocation remain present even if
preferences are perfectly homogeneous. However, as preferences become farther
apart, these problems tend to get worse, as there is a higher disparity between
the preferred levels of (g1;g2;G) by the two legislators.
5.3 Centralization vs decentralization: a brief discussion
A rst consequence of this approach is that the optimal level of surplus is never
attained. By observing the nal allocations, it is immediate that the decentral-
ized regime would attain a solution close to the welfare maximizing outcome if
24In the appendix we prove that EW
k(k;l) can be written as intermediate preferences.
18spillovers are extremely low, which is true if the marginal cost of the national
public good is high. In this case, the uncertainty problem would tend to vanish,
and the main cost of the decentralized regime, which lies on the fact that policy-
makers ignore the spillover eect that the local public good in their jurisdiction
might have on the neighbor district, would be naturally reduced.25 Meanwhile,
in the centralized regime, both misallocation and uncertainty would be at their
worst, since the formation of a low level of spillovers would imply a large pro-
vision of the local public good in the jurisdiction of the agenda setter, but a
negligible provision on the other district.
On the other hand, the centralized system would be closer to obtain the
maximal level of surplus if preferences are close to each other and the marginal
cost of the national public good is low. These two requisites attenuate both un-
certainty and misallocation, which characterize the centralized regime. In this
case, the agenda setter would consider the implementation of a high amount of
spillovers, providing a level of local public goods in the other jurisdiction close
to the one in his own jurisdiction. However, the decentralized regime would
be far from obtaining the surplus yielded by the centralized system, as local
policy-makers would not take into account the possible benets from these low
cost spillovers when deciding how much local public good to provide in their ju-
risdictions. As preferences become farther apart, the uncertainty problem starts
playing a more active role, deviating both systems from the optimal allocation.






























































































Figure 3: When uncertainty and misallocation play a signicant role in public
good provision.
Next, we put centralization against decentralization, separating the cases of
homogeneous and heterogeneous preferences. In what follows, let EWpc and
EWpd denote the expected welfare under centralization and decentralization
25Observe that, under heterogeneous preferences, although the provision of the national




Consider that m1 = m2 = m. In this case, the uncertainty which characterizes
spillovers vanishes, as the interests in the national legislature regarding the
national public good become aligned. However, the local public good in the
centralized system still presents both uncertainty and misallocation issues, which
will drive us through our next result.
In order to keep things more concrete, let us for a moment interpret G as
the quality of a road network which connects two districts. In this stance, for a
high value of , the members of the minimum winning coalition in a centralized
regime simply realize that it is too expensive to enjoy local public goods that
are not in their jurisdiction, as the cost of supplying a high quality infrastruc-
ture connecting both districts is fairly signicative. Hence, the outcome in the
centralized system will, to a great extent, disregard not only the jurisdiction
unrepresented in the winning coalition, but also the infrastructures connecting
both regions, letting them more isolated. The decentralized system, by assigning
decision-making to dierent tiers of government, eliminates this problem of in-
centives, thereby deploying not only better infrastructures, but also an amount
of local public goods more suited to the local context in the region left out of
the winning coalition, yielding a higher welfare.
On the other hand, for low values of , the incentives of the minimum winning
coalition in a centralized system become to some extent aligned with those of
the society. As a result, the agenda setter supplies a higher level of amenities
in the region unrepresented in the coalition, exploiting the benets conveyed by
them through a high quality road connection. In the decentralized system, as it
does not allow the internalization of these low cost spillovers, the supply of local
public goods only takes into account the benets generated within the region
where they are provided. Consequently, the delegate in the national legislature
does not nd worthwhile to supply such infrastructure, as he takes the provision
of the local public goods for granted and cannot inuence it. Therefore, our next
result comes with no surprise.
Proposition 4. Suppose districts are homogeneous. Then, for low values of ,
centralization dominates decentralization, while, for high values of , decentral-
ization achieves a higher welfare.
Observe that proposition 4 does not assure the existence of a unique cuto
value for  which unequivocally separates both systems, which contrasts with
the standard approach and with the decentralization theorems presented in the
literature. The reason is that EWpc   EWpd is not necessarily monotone in
, which limits what can be said about uniqueness of the cuto. Intuitively,
when the cost of spillovers is low, the expected welfare under centralization
responds quicker to increases in  than decentralization, as the policy-maker can
undertake a combined reduction in the supply of the relevant local public good
and in the national public good. This implies that it is not necessary to have
a very large marginal cost in order for the policy-maker in a centralized system
to realize that it does not worth to supply relevant levels of the national public
26Dependence of exogenous parameters is suppressed for convenience.
20good, since the relative benet for him becomes small very fast. On the contrary,
decentralization responds in a more uniform fashion to changes in , since the
supply of local public goods is xed by local governments. Consequently, the
dierence in expected welfare, EWpc   EWpd, is not necessarily monotone for
relatively large values of , since in this region EWpd is more responsive to
small changes in the marginal cost of spillovers than EWpc.27
To wrap up, if preferences are homogeneous, centralization seems to do a
better job if the cost of spillovers is low, since both the uncertainty and mis-
allocation features that characterize the centralized system tend to vanish. On
the other hand, high marginal costs in the provision of national public goods
gives raise to uncertainty and misallocation issues in the centralized regime, mo-
tivated by the selshness of the minimum winning coalition, while minimizing
the problems generated by non-internalization of spillovers in the decentralized
regime. Hence, decision-making based on local wishes should be put rst.
5.3.2 Heterogeneous preferences
Under heterogeneous preferences the incentives of the legislator in a centralized
system are never aligned with those of the society. For high values of , the
decentralized system is able not only to better adapt the supply of public goods
to local needs, but also to solve the selsh incentives of the minimum winning
coalition that lead to uncertainty and misallocation in a centralized regime.
Consequently, decentralization allows a more adequate provision of local public
goods in the region unrepresented in the legislature, which would otherwise be
forgotten by the winning coalition in the centralized system. However, as the
marginal cost of the national public good becomes lower, the outcome is driven
by a complex interaction between the costs and benets of each system. On
one side, the decentralized system ignores spillovers and is not able to solve
the uncertainty problem that characterizes the provision of the national public





2 ;Gpc), but also completely ignores the preferences of the jurisdic-
tion whose legislator does not belong to the winning coalition. This discussion
can be settled in the following decentralization theorem for a non-cooperative
legislature:
Proposition 5. Suppose districts have distinct preferences. Then decentraliza-
tion dominates centralization except, possibly, for low values of .
This result contrasts with the standard approach, where centralization was
perceived as better under homogeneous preferences and could not be ruled out
under heterogeneous preferences. Driving this result is the fact that, under
the standard approach, the policy-maker in a centralized system would set the
vector (g1;g2;G) to the benet of the society, enhancing the case for centraliza-
tion, while under a non-cooperative legislature with no separation of powers the
legislator in a centralized system sets the levels of local public goods and the
amount of spillovers to his own benet. Hence, decentralization can be seen as
a way to go around this problem of incentives created in the centralized system,
as it allows separation of powers among dierent tiers of government.
27However, our numerical results with many distinct specications and parameter values
show that, although monotonicity is in fact a very weak condition in this context, the existence
of a unique cuto is much easier to guarantee.
21It should be noted, however, that the above results cannot be compared
with those presented in the literature, namely in Besley and Coate (2003). The
possible inexistence of a cuto that separates both systems is not due so much
to the eect of endogenous spillovers, but to the fact that we have assumed
a more general specication for the function b(g). We discuss the impact of
endogenous spillovers below.
Example (revisited)
We now take back the same example introduced previously in the standard
approach.28 Figure 4 plots the dierence in welfare between centralization and
decentralization, illustrating the results above.29
Figure 4: Dierence in welfare between centralization and decentralization.
Note that the set of parameters for which centralization outperforms decen-
tralization is very restricted. Only if preferences are not signicantly heteroge-
neous and the cost of the national public good is low, which implies that the
political decisions of the winning coalition in a centralized regime are, to some
extent, aligned with those of the unrepresented region, centralization can be
regarded as a better option. Otherwise, the interests of the region which does
28Recall that:
b(gk) = g0:5
k and K(G) =
G0:5
G0:5 + 1
with  = 1 and m = 5.
29The conclusions we draw, as well as the inexistence of more than one cuto, are extremely
robust to dierent specications and parameter values. However, the monotonicity condition
can be easily broken for large values of , in the region where decentralization dominates
centralization.
22not take part in the coalition may be so severely aected that decentralization
clearly outperforms the centralization. Intuitively, decentralization may simply
pen up the selsh interests of the agenda setter, avoiding the deployment of a
mix of local public goods and spillovers that clearly prejudices the interests of
the society by transferring local public good decision-making to local authorities,
thus eliminating the misallocation eect. This feature, which gains particular
strength when preferences across jurisdiction are somewhat heterogeneous, im-
plies that the existence of a threshold for  which assures the domination of one
system over the other is not assured. The forces at interaction here may simply
shed some light on the reasons why some regions seek to decentralize political
decision-making, but nd unbreakable barriers by the policy-makers in power.
5.4 A comment on endogenous spillovers
Given the previous discussion, it seems that no direct conclusion can be under-
taken when we compare an economy with endogenous spillovers with another
similar economy, but where spillovers are exogenously set. In fact, while, in the
present, centralization allows policy-makers to play with the interaction between
local public goods and spillovers to achieve higher levels of welfare, as they have
one extra degree of freedom in their choice set { endogenous spillover eect {,
this advantage is mostly used by the agenda setter to turn the game into his
favor, increasing the welfare in his jurisdiction at the expense of the other juris-
diction { misallocation eect. The balance of these two eects dictates the nal
outcome:
Proposition 6. Introducing endogenous spillovers has an ambiguous impact
on the trade-o between centralization and decentralization. The endogenous
spillover eect creates a bias towards centralization, whereas the misallocation
eect creates a bias against centralization.
This result can be better illustrated with an example.
Example (continued)
Contrary to the previous illustrations, small changes in the parameters of the
model may have signicant consequences on the conclusions we are able to
extract. In order to capture the main dynamic brought in by introducing en-
dogenous spillovers, we will consider three dierent cases, each representing one
possible outcome from proposition 6. The functional form is:
b(gk) = g




but now  will be allowed to take three dierent values,  = f0:4;0:55;0:7g.
Again, we set  = 1 and m = 5. The outcomes are illustrated in gures 5{
7. The important lines to retain from these gures are the zero-contour lines,
which represent, for each value of m1   m2, the cuto b ; if exists, that makes
the expected welfare under both systems coincide. Along the lines of the above
discussion, observe that the existence of this cuto is not assured for large values
of m1   m2, even when exogenous spillovers are considered.30
30These plots were built following exactly the steps used to prove proposition 6, which can
be found in the appendix.
23Figure 5: Contour lines of the dierence in welfare between centralization and
decentralization, for the case of endogenous and exogenous spillovers,  = 0:55.
The most interesting situation occurs, perhaps, in gure 5. Here, if prefer-
ences across jurisdictions are similar, the cuto point where the welfare under
both systems coincide is slightly increased for the case of endogenous spillovers,
meaning that the policy-maker in a centralized system is able to extract some
benets of the interaction between national and local public goods in favor of
the society, as both objectives are, to some extent, aligned. In this range, the
endogenous spillover eect dominates the misallocation eect. If preferences
become signicantly heterogenous, the gain induced by endogenous spillovers is
not enough to compensate the higher incentives of the policy-maker in a cen-
tralized system to shape the vector (g1;g2;G) to his image, and so the trade-o
is changed in favor of decentralizarion. This illustrates the misallocation eect
in action.
Figure 6 illustrates two alternative outcomes. On the left, the misallocation
eect always dominates, as the costs imposed on the society by the agenda
setter under centralization are sucient to overcome the gains from the interplay
between the vertical and the horizontal dimensions in the provision of public
goods brought in by the endogenous spillover setup. This implies that, for any
value of b  such that exogenous spillovers originates the same expected welfare for
both systems, introducing endogenous spillovers shifts the relative performance
towards the decentralized regime. On the right, on the other hand, the agenda
setter in a centralized regime and in an endogenous spillover framework is able to
improve the level of welfare in the society as compared to the exogenous spillover
setup. To see this, observe that, for all points such that exogenous spillovers
originate identical levels of welfare under both systems, endogenous spillovers
are yielding a positive bias towards centralization. This is due to the endogenous
spillover eect, which, in this case, is taking the utmost advantage of the above
24Figure 6: Contour lines of the dierence in welfare between centralization and
decentralization. On the left,  = 0:4; on the right,  = 0:7.
mentioned interplay between vertically and horizontally provided public goods
that is possible under this new setup to improve the case for centralization.
6 Centralization with separation of powers
It has been recognized in the literature that the minimum winning coalition view
of legislative decision-making is the exception rather than the rule (Besley and
Coate, 2003). In reality, most economies organize decision-making under less
radical decision rules, which usually do imply some sort of separation of powers
among the distinct members that compose the legislature. In this section, we
analyze an alternative approach to decision-making, in which dierent legislators
are responsible for setting vertically distinct policy vectors. In other words, we
consider that the supply of local public goods will be set by one of the members
of the legislature, while the level of spillovers will be dened by the other,
bringing our analysis closer to the realm of most legislatures.
6.1 Policy determination
More specically, let the type of the elected legislator in jurisdiction k in stage
1 be given by k; k = 1;2. In stage 2, one of the legislators, say type k
(henceforth local committee), is randomly selected by nature to set the supply
of both local public goods, while the other legislator, say type l (henceforth
national committee), will be responsible for dening the level of spillovers {
separation of powers at the central level. The rules for decentralization do not
change.





























Note that the legislator will not be anymore able to take into account the
interaction between local and national public goods, since decisions are now























Again, the median voter is pivotal in each jurisdiction,31 and so the imple-





































k;l is dened implicitly by:32
mlb(g
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; k 6= l (28)
6.2 The eects of separation of powers
Again, we can identify the two drawbacks of a centralized system: uncertainty
and misallocation. However, the provision of the national public good is under-
taken by the median voter belonging to a dierent jurisdiction than the one who
set the supply of local public goods. This implies that, although the provision
rules for local public goods are the same as in the centralized system with no
separation of powers, the nal allocations will be dierent. In fact, each of the
two vertical levels that compose the choice of public goods (local and national)
is represented by distinct preferences, since the decisions at each level are a
responsibility of distinct entities.
In order to illustrate the consequences of this approach, throughout the
remaining analysis we will work with the following familiar specication for the
benet from local public goods, which greatly simplies the algebra:
b(g) = g0:5 (29)
No restriction on K(G) is necessary, besides those presented before. Under
this specication, the following result can be derived:
31Writing the expected surplus of a type  citizen in district k, and applying the concept of
intermediate preferences, the result follows immediately.
32The rst subscript denotes the jurisdiction to where the members of the local committee
belong, while the second subscript denotes the jurisdiction of the members of the national
committee.
26Proposition 7. A centralized system with separation of powers delivers a higher
expected welfare as compared with an identical system with no separation of
powers.
In order to understand this result, recall that, in a centralized regime with
no separation of powers, the agenda setter chooses the whole policy vector
(g1;g2;G) to maximize his own utility, completely ignoring the preferences of
the other member in the legislature. This not only imposes a large misalloca-
tion cost, but also a high level of uncertainty, since the allocations tend to be
more extreme, specially when the cost of the national public good is high. If
the allocative powers in the society are distributed among the members of the
legislature, the local committee looses one degree of freedom to the national
committee, who will take advantage of it to set a level of spillovers more appro-
priate to its true preferences. In this way, the expropriation that the members
of the local committee are able to undertake becomes limited, misallocation
and uncertainty are reduced, and expected welfare increases. An immediate
corollary emerges from this discussion:
Corollary 1. With separation of powers, the set of parameters (m1;m2;;)
for which centralization dominates decentralization is increased as compared to
the case of no separation of powers.
Proof. Obvious, following proposition 7.
This result is a direct consequence of proposition 7. While, in a decentral-
ized regime, no vertical strategic interaction is taken into account, a centralized
regime, even with separation of powers, is able consider the vertical interactions
between local and national public goods, while not allowing uncertainty and
misallocation to attain the levels that characterized the non-cooperative legis-
lature with no separation of powers. Note that what induces an organizational
system to integrate vertical interactions is not so much the concentration of
decision-making on a unique source, but mainly the internalization of spillovers,
since this is enough to create a strategic interaction between the members of the
dierent committees. This is why the decentralized regime fails to consider these
interactions, while a centralized regime is always able to take some advantage
of them.
However, in spite of this shift in favor of a centralized system, all decen-
tralization theorems presented in the previous section remain valid. As both
misallocation and uncertainty do not vanish, but are just attenuated, proposi-
tions 4 and 5 still hold, although the range of  for which centralization is better
than decentralization is extended. In particular observe that, if preferences are
heterogeneous, the members of the local committee still impose a large cost
on the society, by setting a supply of local public goods which does not match
the preferences of the members in the national committee. The best that the
members of this committee can do is to attenuate this eect, by using the na-
tional public good to appropriate some benets from the local public good in the
jurisdiction represented by the members of the local committee, but this may
not suce to dictate a superior performance of a centralized system against a
decentralized one.
It is, however, sucient to dictate an improvement in the case for central-
ization, when we compare with the traditional exogenous spillover assumption.
That is:
27Proposition 8. Endogenous spillovers, when compared against exogenous spill-
overs, never improve the case for decentralization when the alternative is cen-
tralization with separation of powers.
Intuitively, separation of powers decreases substantially the misallocation ef-
fect identied in the previous section, making a case for endogenous spillovers.
In fact, if we take into account the actions undertaken by the local committee,
taking spillovers as given, the misallocation eect is the same both with exoge-
nous and endogenous spillovers. But, contrary to the case with no separation of
powers, once we consider the decisions of the national committee, we are able
to create an endogenous spillover eect, resulting from the vertical interactions
between local and national public goods, while not allowing an increase in the
misallocation eect, since separation of powers prevents this from happening.
Example (revisited)
Let us again consider the same illustration of previous sections, with:
b(gk) = g0:5
k and K(G) =
G0:5
G0:5 + 1
Figure 7 plots the contour lines of EWpc   EWpd and EWpcs   EWpd, il-
lustrating both proposition 7 and corollary 1. The former implies that, for all
contour lines such that the case of no separation of powers yields a dierence
in the expected welfare of EWpc   EWpd = w, the case of separation of pow-
ers originates a dierence of EWpcs   EWpd  w.33 The second is a direct
application of the rst, but with w = 0.
Figure 7: Contour lines of the dier-
ence in welfare between centralization
and decentralization, considering the
cases of separation and no separation
of powers.
Figure 8: Contour lines of the dier-
ence in welfare between centralization
with separation of powers and decen-
tralization, for the cases of endogenous
and exogenous spillovers.
Figure 8 plots the contour lines for exogenous and endogenous spillovers.
When compared to the case of exogenous spillovers, endogenous spillovers pro-
vide a shift in the space of parameters for which centralization outperforms
decentralization.
33EWpcs denotes the expected welfare in a non-cooperative legislature with separation of
powers. The remaining notation was presented previously.
28A centralized system with this characteristics can take into account, to some
extent, the vertical interactions between public goods provided at dierent levels
of government, while preventing an excessive appropriation of surplus by some
members of the legislature, while decentralization, due to its characteristics, is
not able benet from this vertical integration. However, decentralization can
still dominate, particularly if preferences are signicantly heterogeneous, a case
in which adapting local public goods to the regional context is more relevant
than any vertical interaction that centralization might be able to integrate.
7 Conclusion
This paper was a rst attempt to integrate vertical interactions between public
goods with distinct spacial characteristics, in a very familiar context: the trade-
o between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods. We
showed, in a framework where the level of spillovers is endogenous and depends
on the provision of a national public good, that dierent organizational sys-
tem integrate these vertical interactions dierently (or not at all), consequently
aecting the decentralization theorems that we know from the literature. We
also illustrated the major changes of this approach as compared to the usual
specication of exogenous spillovers, and presented a new non-cooperative leg-
islature with separation of powers at the central level that is able to deliver a
better relative performance of the centralized system as compared to the more
common case of no separation of powers.
Much is left to be done, however, not only in a context of decentralization,
but also in many other areas, where dierent types of public goods with distinct
spacial characteristics (e.g., local, regional and national) do not interact only at
the horizontal level (same characteristics), but also at the vertical level (dier-
ent characteristics). This interactions may reveal new interesting insights, for
example, in topics like federal systems, or on the number and size of nations.
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31Appendix
A Notation
A.1 Common notation used in the proofs of propositions
1, 2 and 3
Let # = (%;) denote the vector of exogenous parameters, with % = (m1;m2;).
Hence, the vector of public good allocations under decentralization, represented






while, in a cen-





. Using this notation, the maximum level of surplus at-





















































  2gc(#)   Gc(#)
for centralization.





































A.2 Common notation used in the proofs of propositions
4, 5 and 6
Again, let # = (%;) denote the vector of exogenous parameters, with % =
(m1;m2;). The term Wo(#) will be as dened above. The vector of public






























2;k(#) are respectively the welfare in jurisdictions 1 and







































































, where the rst index in local public goods denotes
the region to which it concerns, and the second index denotes the jurisdiction



















2;k(#) are respectively the welfare in jurisdictions 1 and















































































B Proof of results
B.1 Proof of proposition 1
We divide the proof in two claims.
Claim 1. Decentralization produces a lower surplus than optimal.
Proof. First of all, note that go
k(%;) > gd
k(%), for k = 1;2, and Go(%;) >
Gd(%;); 8. The rst relationship is immediate from comparing equations (2)




























; 8, as K00(G) < 0. Hence, the decentral-
ized outcome produces a lower level of surplus than the optimal allocation.
Claim 2. Centralization attains the optimal level of surplus.






















which is also the solution of the centralized system with homogeneous prefer-
ences. Hence, the centralized system yields the maximum level of surplus.
From these two claims proposition 1 follows immediately. 
33B.2 Proof of proposition 2
We begin by establishing two claims.
Claim 3. The dierence in welfare between the two systems, Wc(%;) Wd(%;),
is strictly decreasing in .












































= Gd(%;)   Gc(%;)
We now prove that Gd(%;) Gc(%;) < 0; 8, with b(g) = g0:5. Under this
















; k = 1;2
Making use of conditions (6) and (8), which give us the provision rules for
the national public good G for both systems, it is immediate to show that
Gd(%;)   Gc(%;) < 0 is equivalent to:

















since K0(G) is decreasing in G. So, in order to reach a contradiction, suppose
that:

















and consider the set of parameters (m1;m2) that constitute any mean preserving
spread of m, such that m1 = m(1 + ") and m2 = m(1   "); " 2 [0;1]. Thus,


















































































34A contradiction! Hence, Gd(%;) Gc(%;) < 0; 8, and strict monotonicity
follows.
Claim 4. Centralization dominates decentralization for low values of , while
it is dominated for large values of .








as the allocations under a centralized regime converge to the optimal ones as 








as the allocations of local and national public goods under a decentralized system
converge to the optimum as  goes to innity.
Hence, it follows, by the intermediate value theorem, that 91b  : Wc(%;b ) =
Wd(%;b ). 
B.3 Proof of proposition 3
Let us rst consider the case of exogenous spillovers, and take the following




, where Gd(%;) is dened
as in equation (6) in text. That is, for  2 [0;1), there exists a unique level of
G 2 [0;1) that originates a given amount of spillovers  2 [0;1), given %, and
it is convenient to take the rule Gd(%;) to be dened as in the decentralized
solution.
Next, we solve both maximization problems presented in the text subject to
this rule, and evaluate the objective functions at the solution. Letting c Wc(%;)
and c Wd(%;) denote the welfare attained under centralization and decentral-
ization respectively, we obtain:































; k = 1;2 and b gc(%;) =





Now, let us return to the present case with endogenous spillovers. In the
decentralized system, the level of the national public good is dened by Gd,
which was used in the mapping above. Hence, welfare remains unchanged when
compared to exogenous spillovers, i.e., c Wd(%;) = Wd(%;). As for central-
ization, observe that the problem solved in the text is just the unconstrained
35version of the maximization problem presented above. It follows that the ob-






b Sc(g;%;) = c Wc(%;)
where:




 b(g)   2g   G
and:
b Sc(g;%;) = (m1 + m2)  [1 + ]  b(g)   2g   K 1()
Hence,
Wc(%;)   Wd(%;)  c Wc(%;)   c Wd(%;)








the introduction of endogenous spillovers will never put centralization in a lower
standard as compared to decentralization, i.e., Wc(%0;0)   Wd(%0;0)  0.







 0, but Wc(%;)   Wd(%;)  0, which implies proposition 3.

B.4 Proof of proposition 4













By continuity, the proposition follows immediately.
Observe that monotonicity cannot be assured, and thereby the behavior of
EWpc(%;)   EWpd(%;) cannot be ascertain for intermediate values of . 
B.5 Proof of proposition 5





for which case decentralization dominates centralization. On the other hand, as
 approaches zero, the relationship between EWpd(%;) and EWpc(%;) can-
not be traced down. Two situations may occur: rst, if lim!0 EWpd(%;) >
lim!0 EWpc(%;), then decentralization may dominate centralization for all
possible values of ; second, if lim!0 EWpd(%;) < lim!0 EWpc(%;), cen-
tralization dominates decentralization for low values of . 
36B.6 Proof of proposition 6
We divide the proof in several steps.
Connecting exogenous spillovers to endogenous spillovers
Let us dene the following virtual element:















































; k = 1;2. Also, consider the following
application:




which maps the level of spillovers, p, to their cost, , through the function
Gp(%;). Assume, for now, that this application exists and is well dened
(below we prove that this is in fact true). Hence, the welfare under exogenous
spillovers can be written as:
c Wpd(%;p) = f Wpd 
%;Gp(%;)
















Now, we choose Gp(%;) so that the expected welfare in a decentralized
system with endogenous spillovers coincides with that of exogenous spillovers.
We are allowed to do this because the rules for local public good provision are
the same, i.e., g
pd
k (%) does not depend on the type of spillovers we consider (see


















It remains to prove existence. As f Wpd(%;G) is everywhere concave in G,
then there exists one e G 2 [e G2; e G1]; G2  G1 such that:




f Wpd(%; e G1) + f Wpd(%; e G2)
i
which implies that the rule Gp(%;) exists and is well dened.
37The case of exogenous spillovers
Now, we follow the same steps as in section 5 to nd the levels of local public
goods, both for centralization and decentralization, subject to the rule p, and
evaluate the welfare in jurisdiction 1 and 2. Let c W
pd
1 (%;p) and c W
pd
2 (%;p)
denote these levels of welfare for decentralization, where the index denotes the
jurisdiction in which welfare is being evaluated. Hence:
c W
pd












































k (%) = g
pd
k (%); k = 1;2. Also, let:
c Wpd(%;p) = c W
pd
1 (%;p) + c W
pd
2 (%;p)
For centralization, let c W
pc
k;l(%;p) and b g
pc
k;l(%;p) dene respectively the level
of welfare and the supply of the local public good in jurisdiction k if the ap-
pointed agenda setter in the national legislature belongs to jurisdiction l.
The objective of the legislator is, in this case, to maximize his utility subject










































































































1;1(%;p) + c W
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2;1(%;p) + c W
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The case of endogenous spillovers
Now, let us return to the case where spillovers are endogenous. In the decentral-
ized system, it is immediate that the solution coincides with the one set above,
by construction. Hence, it follows that EWpd(%;) = c Wpd(%;p).
For centralization, let W
pc
k;l(%;) dene the welfare in jurisdiction k if the
appointed agenda setter in the national legislature belongs to jurisdiction l, and
observe that the winning politician is maximizing his welfare, with one extra
degree of freedom as compared to the case of exogenous spillovers { this is
the endogenous spillover eect. Thereby, W
pc
k;k(%;)  c W
pc
k;k(%;p); k = 1;2.
Regarding jurisdiction l, the above rule may be or not welfare improving, since
this region does not show up in the maximization problem of the agenda setter.
38This means that both the endogenous spillover eect { which is due to the
enlargement in the choice vector of the agenda setter {, and the misallocation
eect { which results from the fact that the welfare in jurisdiction l is ignored
for the choice of the relevant policy vector {, may inuence the outcome in this
jurisdiction. As the former is clearly positive and the latter clearly negative,
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) Q c W
pc
















Collecting the eects, we get:


















































The rst two terms are only aected by the endogenous spillover eect, and
are clearly non-negative. However, the last two are endowed with both the
endogenous spillover eect and the misallocation eect, and hence the sign is
unclear, depending on which eect dominates. Clearly, the impact on welfare
of introducing endogenous spillovers depends on the balance between these two
forces, as the misallocation eect on the last two terms may overcome all benets
generated by introducing endogenous spillovers. 
B.7 Proof of proposition 7
Under b(g) = g0:5, the provision of public goods become:









































































; k 6= l
As we can observe, the rules for local public good provision are the same,
what changes between systems is the level of the national public good. Let us











































































The term f Wk(%;;Gk) is the hypothetical welfare if the policy maker in
jurisdiction k is selected to set the supply of local public goods. It follows
that g EW(%;;G1;G2) is the hypothetical expected welfare of the society. If
Gk = G
pc
k ; k = 1;2, then g EW(%;;G1;G2) delivers the expected welfare under
no separation of powers, while, if Gk = G
pcs
k;l ; k;l = 1;2; k 6= l, g EW(%;;G1;G2)
yields the expected welfare with separation of powers.










= ; k;l = 1;2; k 6= l
It is immediate to observe that G





< 0; k;l = 1;2; k 6= l
40Observe that the FOC of this problem yields exactly the same solution as






k) = f Wk(%;;G
pcs
k;l )  f Wk(%;;G
pc
k ); k = 1;2; k 6= l



















2 ) = EWpc(%;), the result follows. 
B.8 Proof of proposition 8
The result follows from the proofs of proposition 6 and 7, and so we only provide
a brief sketch to the proof. As the decentralized regime does not change relative
to the case with no separation of powers, we can take the mapping  = KoGp()
dened in the proof of proposition 6, which equalizes the expected welfare in a
decentralized system with exogenous and endogenous spillovers. This provides
the basis for comparison.
Next, we allow the centralized system with separation of powers to optimize,
and compare the result with the expected welfare under the assumption of
exogenous spillovers. From the proof of proposition 7, we know that the outcome
under centralization with endogenous spillovers maximizes the expected welfare
of the economy, g EW(%;;G1;G2), and therefore it must follow that, once we















C.1 Derivation of the optimal solution










 b(g2)   (g1 + g2)   G









































 K0(G)   
Since go
1(G) > 0 and go
2(G) > 0 8 G, we have that limG!0 '(G) = 1 and
limG!1 '(G) =  . As by assumption [m1b(go
2(G)) + m2b(go
1(G))]  K0(G)
is decreasing in G, there exists a unique G such that '(G) = 0. Letting
G = Go, the above conditions dene the triplet (go
1;go
2;Go) described in the
text.
To check that the vector (go
1;go
2;Go) represents a maximizer, let us start
by dening jHz(g;G)j as the determinant of the Hessian after deleting the last
3   z rows and columns. Some algebra allows us to conclude that jH1(g;G)j <
0 and jH2(g;G)j > 0: In order to prove that jH3(g;G)j < 0; we must take
the derivative of [m1b(go
2(G) + m2b(go
1(G)]  K0(G) with respect to G (which is
negative, by assumption) and use it in the expression for jH3(g;G)j. As this is
extremely cumbersome, we omit the technical details. 
C.2 Derivation of the centralized solution
The problem to solve is:
max
g;G




 b(g)   2g   G














where m = m1+m2













Letting Gc = G, we obtain the maximizing vector (gc;Gc) dened in the
text.
Proving that the vector (gc;Gc) denes a maximizer follows the same steps
as for the optimal solution. 
D Writing expected welfare as intermediate pref-
erences
Let us write EW
k(k;l) as follows:
EW




































































Noticing that J(k;l) and H(k;l) are equal for all voters in jurisdiction
k, the result follows immediately. 
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